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A SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE APPROACH TO
UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES
WilliamK. Gahrenyajr.
Florida Institute of Technology
Melbourne, U.S.A.

In this chapter I discuss several conceptualizations of indigenous psychology movements and identify some critical issues and challenges with
which research on these movements must contend. I do not address the
intellectual agenda of the movements; instead, I take the role of a sociologist, uying to understand the course of a scientific discipline as an encl in
itself. I will touch on five broad topics, each briefly.
•
•
•

How can we look at the movements in a sociological manner? I
suggest several models and present some supportive data.
Who can and who may study these movements' Who has the requisite authority and who has the right?
How is indigenous psychology rearranging the specialties of social
science?

•

What is the effect of national wealth in the development of indigenous psychology'
How do we know when there's progress?

Some research results will be presented in a cursory fashion. This
paper is intended to stimulate thought and to bring some controversial
topics to the fore more than to present these ideas and issues in a fully
developed form. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, please
refer to Gabrenya (in preparation-a; in preparation-b).
The Sociological Approach
My approach to understanding indigenous movements focuses on the
social, organizational, political, and societal aspects of the movements
rather than their intellectual content, except to the extent that this content
is itself a source of data. The approach is essentially sociological: "sociology of science" (SoS), outsider analysis of the movements. In my use of
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SoS, I'm interested in three phenomena: First, the career of the psychologist, conducted within an academic community and a societal setting;
second, the dynamics of social movements that guide and constrain careers; and third, the effect of societal and situational characteristics on the
intellectual activities of the academic researcher. One could say that this is
a very "cold" approach to the problem in its reduction of the career strivings
of many of our colleagues to mere data (much as we treat our research
subjects). Cold as the approach may be, at the outset I would like to
express my greatest respect for the work of indigenous psychologists and
my view that their movements make positive contributions to the field.
The Sociology of Science, also tenned Social Studies of Science and
sometimes Social Psychology of Science, attempts to understand science,
here indigenous psychology, as a social phenomenon occuning in a particular time and place, and does not concern itself with the validity of the
intellectual argument. We are not concerned with who is right and who is
wrong, or indeed if anyone in social science is making real progress. (Of
course, progress is always desirable.) SoS, broadly, looks at science in a
societal context, focusing on how societal processes and events affect the
direction, speed, and in some accounts, content, of science. It also looks
closely at the career dynamics of individual scientists, their motivations,
lifestyles, personalities, reward structures, positions in the social stratification system of the society (e.g., gender and ethnicity), social networks,
career paths, and educational experiences (cf. Ben-David, 1981; Cole &
Cole, 1973; Cole, 1992; Merton, 1973; Restivo, 1994; Shadish & Fuller, 1994;
Zuckerman, 1988)
Unfonunately, SoS itself encompasses sharply contrasting approaches
to science that generally fall on the same dimension that cross-cultural and
cultural psychologists always argue about: relativism (Zuckerman, 1988).
In this context, the universalists are often called "realists" because they
believe that there is a real, natural world d1at scientists gradually reveal
through research and analysis. The speed at which various branches of
science progress, the wrong turns, the distribution of face and favor among
scientists, and so on, are viewed as socially or culturally determined, but
fundamentally there is something real to be discovered. Wrong turns will
eventually be straightened out d1rough good scientific practice.
The relativists are social constructionists who believe to va1ying degrees that science is a social product influenced by social and cultural
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processes (e.g. Restivo, 1994). Since the constructionists are themselves
social scientists researching science, they proceed to deconstruct their own
research as well, rendering their activities "doubly relativist" and outside
of our concern in the present paper.
The difficult problem for even a realist approach to indigenous psychology is that social science is often considered less "paradigmatic" than
natural science in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1970), and the realism-const:ructionism problem is strikingly more problematic. The implication of
this problem is that it is very possible that a SoS of indigenous psychology
might take several steps beyond not caring if the content of the movement's
ideas are right or wrong. For example, it might assume from the start that
both itself and all social science are at least partially wrong (at least at
present). However, regardless of the validity of the intellectual content of
the field, my interest in this research is in indigenous psychology as a
social phenomenon.

Five Paths to Indigenous Psychology
I have developed a series of process models that describe "paths"
through which indiv.idual psychologists and national communities of psychologists become progressively more indigenous at ideological, behavioral, and organizational levels. My research in Taiwan has been aimed at
trying to find support for selected components of these models. I am a
cultural materialist (Harris, 1979, 1999), and I view the situation of working scientists as an ecological niche to which they must adapt in order to
survive and thrive. These models rely heavily on the situational constraints
of careers. In its strong form, this approach argues that ideological or
intellectual products spring from these ecological concerns and then perhaps exert an autonomous influence on the course of the movement.
These models are discussed here very briefly; for a more complete explanation and a description of the empirical research, see Gabrenya (in preparation-a; in preparation-b). Indigenous psychology movements may be
facilitated through any combination of the five paths; no single path can be
assumed to be necessary or sufficient.
The Localirrel.evance Path
Indigenous movements complain that Western psychology is irrelevant to their local cultural milieus (e.g., Enriquez, 1997; Kim & Berry, 1993;
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Naidoo, Olowu, Gilbe1t, & Akotia 1999; Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000;
Sinha, 1997; Yang, 1993, 1997a, 2000). This complaint is certainly one of
the key intellectual arguments of the movements, but of interest here is the
felt experience of the academic psychologist. I argue that Western-trainee!
psychologists experience four kincls of i1Televancy in their work when they go
home to a non-Western count1y, and that this experience motivates, in
part, the exploration of indigenous thinking. Locally-eclucatecl psychologists have many of the same experiences, and are socialized to local disciplinary norms. First, the topics that were studied in Western graduate
schools (or published in Western journals) may seem silly and unimportant, especially in areas like experimental social psychology. Second, the
methods taught in Western graduate programs may be difficult to use
given local resources, or tied to topics that are themselves out of place.
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Third, the Protestant ideology of Western science may feel discordant with
local ideologies, and the arguably rigorous and remote methodology of
neo-positivist, quantitative research may seem irrelevant. Finally, the language of graduate training, such as English, may present conceptual problems in dealing with local people and culture, and practical challenges to
publishing and communication with Western colleagues.
Research in Taiwan provided various types of evidence supporting
these ideas. A sample of 103 Taiwanese psychologists participated in a
mail survey that addressed each of the models described here. (See
Gabrenya, in preparation-a, for details of the research.) For example, we
asked respondents if their main topics of interest in graduate school, and
presently, could be investigated using empirical methods tl1at are commonly used in Western psychology. The relevance of Western empirical
methods varied as a function of respondents' field (social, experimental,
clinical, applied),"1{3, 83) = 6.72,p< .05, of whether we were referring to
their graduate school or current research, J{l, 83) = 6.03, p < .05, and of
whether they received tl1eir doctoral degree in Taiwan or in the West, J{l,
83) = 4.91, p < .05. The results show tl1at respondents in the three nonexperimental fields have come to see Western methods as less appropriate, and that Taiwanese-trained psychologists feel this way more than
Western-trained psychologists. (See Figure 1.)
Conditions of Work Path

The Conditions of Work path hypothesizes that several characteristics
of an academic employment situation affect career activities and goals,
such as the expectations and resources of the university, teaching loads,
t11e imp01tance of and support for publishing, and certain outside, societal
factors. In many non-Western nations, these situational factors present
contingencies that differ from those that returning Ph.D.s experienced while
in Western graduate schools, and a satisfying career in line with the expectations and goals acquired in graduate school may be unattainable. Sometimes indigenous programs offer more obtainable expectations, and a career can be redefined. This sort of problem may in fact be faced by every
academic who is trained in a research university but then must find a
career in a teaching university or very small school
Two measures in our survey study addressed this problem. We asked
respondents to evaluate me quality of the resources available in Taiwan
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compared to what they thought was available in the West. The overall
assessment was ve1y negative: 77% of respondents rated Taiwan below die
midpoint of the scale, and 43% chose the lowest scale value. We also
asked respondents the extent to which working far from the West makes
it difficult to keep current in their field, and found a similar result. Only
25% claimed it was easy or very easy to keep cutTent. This problem
appears to be more serious for younger faculty; a moderate relationship
was found between year of degree and difficulty, ,;, 6, = .41, p < .0001.
Nationalldentity Path

Participants in indigenous psychology movements are keenly aware
of the political and academic domination of Europe and America and
evidence various degrees of resentment of this situation. They also realize,
as some citation research has illustrated (Gabrenya, 1988b), that Western
psychologists generally ignore the theory and research coming out of nonWestern countries, and do so because of a misguided universalism, or
more seriously, a misguided "absolutism" (Adamopoulos & Lonner, 1994;
Lonner, 2000). Out of this situation, given sufficient societal resources, we
might expect the development of a movement to establish a psychological
identity in its own right, independent of Western ideas and dominance. No
one likes to be ignored.
Our su1vey of Taiwanese psychologists included four items that formed
an index measure of this felt need for identity and recognition. Social,
clinical and applied psychologists indicated a need for identity (Ms= 3.88
to 3.99 on a 5-point scale), whereas experimental psychologists tended not
to (M= 2.79), R..3, 87) = 6.78,p< .001. Throughout mis research, experimental
psychologists showed a preference for a universalist, natural science conception of psychology that usually precluded indigenous thinking.
The Great Leader Path

The familiar Great Man versus Zeitgeist debate returns in the present
context. It appears that most of the extant indigenous movements have (or
had at their inceptions) strong leaders whose ideas and influence appeared instrumental in the movements' progress. A SoS analysis examines
the impact of these leaders and asks difficult questions such as what will
become of the movements after these leaders become less active, even if
the cultural milieu supportive of indigenous movements continues.
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Some indirect supp01t for the importance of leadership was found in
our research. Our respondents were asked to nominate a leader of the
Taiwan movement, and among respondents who answered these questions, about 90% chose the eminent psychologist Kuo-Shu Yang as the
movement's intellectual as well as organizational leader. I interpret this
high consensus as an indicator of strong leadership.
Social Movements

Indigenous movements appear to share many of the defining traits of
social movements (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988; Snow & Oliver,
1995): ideology; charismatic leadership; members who share personal
motivations for participation; resources; social or material control over
members; a supportive milieu; a sense of identity that is tied in part to
what they are against and in part to what they hope to change. Adopting
a social movem~nt perspective allows us to understand the development
of indigenous psychology as a truly social phenomenon.
We would expect that one accomplishment of a successful academic
social movement would be control of critical resources such as grant funding and faculty positions. We asked our respondents if their research
needed to be ''indigenized"' in order to be funded locally. Respondents
from all fields reported that they needed to indigenize for funding (Ms =
3.5 to 3.7) with the exception of experimental psychology (M = 2.2), R3,
66) = 7.0, p < .001. Among experimental psychologists, 20% reported some
degree of need to indigenize (endorsing scale responses "neutral, somewhat needed, very much needed") while among the other three field
groups, 84% reported such a requirement.

Wealth: The Sixth Path
From a SoS or a social movements perspective, we should look at the
intersection of wealth and other factors in predicting when an indigenous
movement will appear. The development of psychology may run parallel
to the development of democratic political institutions, both appearing
and prospering under favorable economic conditions in the context of
societal modernization. In the same manner that democracy requires the
development of "civil society," indigenous psychology may depend for its
development on the achievement of a certain level of "psychological infra-
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structure": sufficient Ph.D. psychologists, faculty positions, research opportunities, social acceptance, and so on. Psychology is an expensive activity
and, like art, it "follows the money" (Sarason, 1981). Since the lifting of
martial law in 1987 Taiwan certainly provided these prerequisite conditions for democracy and indigenous psychology, and both have flourished
(Marsh, 1996). Korea has followed a similar course. Understanding the
complex mechanisms--economic, social, and psychological-through
which wealth affects cultural change in general, and the development of
indigenous movements in particular, requires a societal-level analysis.
Cognitive Ecology
Restivo 0994), following in the tradition of Adam Smith, Marx, and
Veblen, suggested that "what [scientists] do is more an outcome of the
pressure of the situation they are in than of what they have earlier 'internalized'" (p. 106). His concept of "occupational culture" (common tasks,
work schedules, job training, career patterns) applies readily to the situations of psychologist working in different nations. "Cognitive ecology"
refers to situational influences on the ideas of the working scientist, analogous to an ecological niche but emphasizing the effect of the niche experience on intellectual activity such as metatheories, epistemological orientations, theories, and values. Situations might be viewed in a hierarchical
structure beginning at the scientist's academic depamnent and the courses
he or she teaches and extending up or out to the zeitgeist or weltanschauung
of his or her time and place. Even in an "era of unprecedented information
overload " the load is not evenly balanced and what the psychologist
experiences intellectually and ideologically day to day reflects more the
nature of his or her social and scientific community than of all the ideas
extant in the discipline (especially in a global context). The situations
described in the five paths discussed previously in this chapter also represent much of the substance of the cognitive ecological niche of the psychologist.
A strong version of this ecological argument holds that psychologists
can't think too far beyond the ideology and intellectual content of their
cognitive ecological niche, whereas a weak one would suggest a more
distal or multiply determined influence. Both versions suggest that American psychology's slowness in understanding the importance of culture can
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be explained by the monocultural experiences afforded psychologists
working in a large, insular, effectively monocultural nation.' For example,
my informal obsetvation of the field suggests that people don't choose
cross-cultural psychology because they come to a careful assessment of its
value based on a full intellectual review; rad1er, they have experiences
mat wrench mem from the cognitive ecology of d1e mainstream.
The cognitive ecology of a Western graduate program can be expected to constrain thought, and of course action, along the lines of Western psychology in a myriad of ways, including explicit contingencies placed
on students, d1e depa11ment's value system, and the kinds of experiences,
coursework, and ideas to which mey are exposed. Most psychologists will
not deviate from this ecological constraint unless something happens d1at
"reorients their cognitive ecology." PhDs returning from Western graduate
programs to non-Western countries are by necessity subject to a transfom1ing experience_:mey go home. The cognitive ecology they experience
upon return is different than that of their graduate training and differs from
me cognitive ecology experienced by those of their graduate school peers
who made d1eir careers in the West. Beyond simply a matter of irrelevancy, a different way of thinking about psychology might be expected,
perhaps influenced by the processes desc1ibed in the other models outlined previously.
Who Can and May Study These Movements?
TI1e implicit assumption made in this chapter so far has been that the
author has the right to perform this research and has the authority (in the
academic sense) to present his findings to an audience of his peers. Although in science the writer's c.v. should suffice as the source of his or her
scientific aumority, in me present context the issue of aumority is complicated by the persistent insider-outsider debate. We ask, who can and may
study me indigenous movements of others?
"Can" and "may" are different ideas. "Can" begs the question of what
we are capable of knowing; '·may" of what we are allowed to do. Not
unlike and1ropologists, cross-cultural psychologists have an ongoing, difficult, awkward, maybe exploitative, relationship with the "other" that we
hope to figure out. In anthropology, the post-modern debate rages as to
whemer we can ever know me "other" and if so, how our research can be
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sufficiently grounded, intersubjective, emic, relative, and so on, to approach an understanding of the other (D'Andrade, 2000). For these reasons, some Anthropologists have concluded that tl1ey cannot study the
Otl1er, while for ethical or political reasons some feel that they may not.
However, I know of no writing by indigenous psychologists that directly
claims tl1at outsiders may not study their movements. But the same might
not be true for can.
My experience, so far, has been that insiders to an indigenous movement cast a cold eye on outsiders who are peeking in. From an epistemological perspective, these movements take a skeptical stance in tl1eir evaluation of outsider, etic, cross-cultural strategies in general (e.g., see Kim,
2000). Compounding the metl10dological objection, outsiders studying
indigenous movements are also famously ill-informed and possibly disruptive. We are ill-informed because we are outside the cultural, academic, and national systems in which the movements develop (Yang,
1997b). Sometimes we cannot speak or read the language in which our
data (textual anifacts) are written. (The writings coming from within the
movement are the data for studying it from without, but only if the outsider
can read them). Our work is, some might say, "shallow." A similar critique
has been made by cultural psychology of cross-cultural psychology (see
Hwang & Yang, 2000; Yamaguchi, 2002). However, I argue that this is
both a weakness of which we have long been aware, and a strength if etic
research strategies are valued. I suggest that outsider perspectives are botl1
(a) always shallow and (b) a necessary complement to insider perspectives. Antl1ropologists not associated with tl1e post-modern movement have
long recognized tl1e value of outsider perspectives:
" ... a century of fielclwork has proven that it is the outsider who is able
to aniculate cultural practices that are invisible and commonsensical
to insiders" (Fiske, 2002, p. 85).
This is a year of ironies in the world, and the insider-outsider problem
has its own. Much of tl1e ideological content of indigenous psychologies
begins witl1 a two-pronged critique of Western psychology: first, of its
validiry for studying cultures outside the West, and maybe for studying its
own culture, too; and second, of its motives in studying non-Western
peoples and in studying non-Western psychologies. However, tl1is critique
of Western psychology is itself performed from an outsider perspective.
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Phrased slightly differently, indigenous psychologies could be viewed as
taking an outsider perspective in criticizing Western psychology, including
its sins, as an outsider. uoutside" is a relative assessn1ent, and it is true that

many non-Western social scientists have lived in tl1e West and studied
Western psychology, while the opposite is less common. It is difficult to
assess the extent to which these social scientists, living briefly in the West
as young foreign students, really come to understand Western culture in
sufficient depm. To use me central term of Taiwanese indigenous psychology, the non-Western critique of Western psychology can never achieve
bentu qi-hexing, indigenous compatibility wim the research subject (K. S.
Yang, 1997b; but see C. F. Yang, 1997, for an opposing point of view),
because those performing the criticism can never share the perspective of
tl1e subject. Taken at face value, tl1is state of affairs leaves all sides incapable of bentu qi-hexing and highly limited in their research prospects.
However, I believe that both insider and outsider research present useful,
mutually balancing perspectives. For example, the outsider critique of Western Psychology has been shallow and unfair, but at the same time very
effective in calling to Western psychologists' attention our bad habit of perfomling culturally uninfonned "imposed etic" research "by 747" (Doob, 1980).2
Disruptive Outsiders
Outsiders who study indigenous movements are disruptive in the
same sense as any anmropologist hanging around a tight commurlity and
asking awkward questions. One is reminded of Napoleon Chagnon's (1968)
. experience among me Yanamamo. We know what he experienced and
what he found, but we don't know how much trouble he caused in Bisaasiteri village. In my own research on t11e Taiwan indigenous psychology
movement, I encountered considerable reluctance among my research
subjects, sometin1es of me form, "here's what I tl1ink but please don't use
my name because I want to keep my job." I eventually learned, for example, that I could get more survey data by having it mailed back to
Florida tl1an to my research assistant in a Taiwan university. But the other
side of tl1is reluctance was d1at I found myself in a role not unlike Chagnon's,
a confidante or outsider to whom "mings could be said" to the extent that
I was trusted to keep secrets or maintain anonymity. I was careful with my
database of field notes.
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As an outsider/foreigner studying a controversial social movement, it
is difficult to make anyone happy. Members of the movement assume you
are engaged in a Western-biased attack on their work, and critics of the
movement suspect you are trying to support people who they believe are
wasting precious grant money. Members have their own internal conflicts
(e.g., see Hwang, 1997; Yu, 1997) and some are insecure about the status
of the movement; non-members are worried about being seen as outside
the movement. The result is, of course, insecurity on the part of the researcher, frustration, a sense of being in over one's head, and a pervasive
feeling that social psychology was never this mysterious.
The Fish Scale Model
Donald Campbell, a brilliant psychologist who cross-cultural psychology (and several other areas) can call one of its own, wrote in the field of
SoS. His "fish-scale model of social science" suggests another way to look at
indigenous psychology. Campbell argued in this 1969 paper that academic
specialties are like overlapping fish scales, and academic fields are collections of scales. The collections are not completely arbitrary but their boundaries were determined in the past by various historical processes in the
context of Western universities. Once a field, like psychology, is established through the collection of adjacent scales or specialties, processes of
group dynamics, occupational socialization, chauvinism, and academic
political economy (competition for resources) come into play that gradually bring the specialties closer to the central values, beliefs, and behaviors
of the field. The field, transmitted at ground level through the experiences
and contingencies of being in an academic department, produces a proximal component of the cognitive ecology that I discussed previously.
Individual scientists working in "deviant" specialties within the discipline have a difficult time getting respect, promotions, and resources, and
in the encl have to make hard choices that involve their career aspirations
and feeding their families.' Campbell argued that the chauvinism and
organizational politics of disciplines impairs communication between adjacent specialties that happened to fall into different disciplines (e.g., crosscultural psychology and psychological anthropology), and this is a problem for social science. I think we experience this all the time in our own
work, as I have argued elsewhere (Gabrenya, 1988a).
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Indigenous psychology (and probably cultural psychology) seems to
be attempting to redefine psychology by rearranging the scales, placing
specialties that now fall in psychology and anthropology into the same
field. For example, much indigenous work has adopted variants of the
ethnographic field methods of anthrnpology and utilizes the theoretical
material of philosophy and cultural studies (e.g., Hwang, 2001). Of course,
this violation of boundaries makes everybody angry, because d10se at the
center of d1e field (read: experimental psychology) can't appreciate the
way the deviants at d1e periphery (read: cultural psychology, indigenous
psychology, cross-cultural psychology) are thinking and acting.
Does Progress Matter?

I have stated that the Sos approach doesn't care if the actual products
of the disciplines.or specialties under examination are scientifically right or
wrong. But in fact, if one takes a realist point of view, one could include
"progress" as a valid object of study. So how do we know if indigenous
psychologies are making progress in their own cultural domains or if they
contribute to d1e progress of world psychology? In Taiwan, K. S. Yang
frequently cites various indicators of progress (e.g., see Yang, 1997a), but
he is concerned with the progress of a social movement as much as, and
possibly more than, simply scientific progress. The reader will recognize
the old issue: is social science progressing? In the American pragmatic
tradition, we would say that progress is indicated when something works
to solve a real problem. Unfortunately, the content of much indigenous
work, at least in Taiwan, can't be evaluated that way because it takes a
highly d1eoretical, sometimes ethnographic, style. However, one domain
of indigenous activity in Taiwan can be scrutinized from the criterion of
pragmatism-applied psychology. Applied psychology must be effective
in the local cultural context, or else it disappears; it is indigenous, or it is
gone.' In my Taiwan research, I found d1at the applied psychologists
shared many indigenous beliefs and attitudes-their appr-disal of positivism, acceptance of indigenous psychology, etc.-with social psychologists,
in sharp contrast to experimental psychologists.
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Conclusion
My concerns in this chapter focused on whether the SoS approach is
useful, whether my models are valid, and whether or not we can actually
perform this research using each other as "subjects" without causing the
kinds of problems that make life as an academic unpleasant. I proposed a
set of models to describe the paths along which psychologists in nonWestern societies may travel in their journey from an imposed Western
psychology to an indigenizecl, local psychology. The models are ecological or materialist in two senses: the development of indigenous psychology is viewed within the social and economic "ecological setting" of the
greater society; and the scientific thinking and creativity of the psychologist is viewed within the "cognitive ecology" of the immediate work situation and larger cultural milieu.
Sociology of science presents a way of thinking that is at once familiar
to psychologists trained in the etic traditions of theoretical, universalise
research, but at the same time alien in its greater distance from the subject
and its disinterest in the validity of the subject's activities and products.
This way of viewing the field is not completely unfamiliar to cross-cultural
psychology, as evidenced by the several citation analyses and overall
appraisals of the field that have appeared over the years (Doob, 1980;
Gabrenya, 1988b, 1997; Lonner, 1980, 1994; Onge! & Smith, 1994). However, to my knowledge, the domain of activities-the development of
disciplines, the behavior of incliviclual psychologists---0n which the SoS
analysis focuses is much broader, more difficult to quantify, more amenable to multiple interpretations, and ultimately more controversial than
any previous research of which I am aware.
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Notes
1

2

Although America is a multicultural society, I suggest that the experiences of psychologists are much more monocultural than those of psychologists outside the United States: "Even the rat was white" (Guthrie,
1997).
Extending this irony, I argue that the outsider critique by cultural psychology aimed at its aging parent, cross-cultural psychology, has been
shallow, unfair, and in the end the best thing to happen to cross-cultural
psychology since Hofstede's first book (Hofstede, 1980).
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3

4

This is why it's so hard to get a good job doing cultural or cross-cultural
psychology. We all are working in specialties that are deviant from the
central perspective of modern psychology.
Lin (2000) illustrates dramatically the failure of an insufficiently indigenized
clinical psychology to respond to the mental health service needs of
victims of the 1999 Taiwan earthquake.
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